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Antonio Giustozzi. The Art of Coercion: The Primitive Accumulation and Management of
Coercive Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
Any serious attempt to predict the future requires both substantial knowledge of the
relevant historical past and a willingness to grapple with it less pleasant aspects. Without such
mindful attention, the lessons history might otherwise provide remain unappreciated or lost.
Most of the more confident predictions made by world leaders, pundits, and even social scientists
in the early post-Cold War period about how rapidly and comprehensively the international
system would change demonstrate this fact; lessons that had been previously learned were
ignored, seen then as irrelevant chapters in a tale of progress toward an ever-more peaceful and
orderly world. This tendency to discount the lessons history has to offer has been particularly
pronounced in US foreign policy circles, where the belief that an American colossus would stand
astride the world, forcing rogues to mend their ways, dispensing order and justice, and generally
exercising a permanent global hegemony has only slowly deflated as the limits of American
power have become all too obvious in a succession of failed enterprises and Pyrrhic victories.
Interestingly, the first stark warning of the limitations on American power in a post-Cold War
world occurred in Somalia, a country so feeble that the state itself had collapsed. The activities of
a collection of warlords turned a humanitarian mission authorized by the UN Security Council
into a peacemaking effort and, ultimately, a humiliating strategic defeat as the 1993 Battle of
Mogadishu convinced the Clinton Administration to end its proactive efforts to humble
Somalia’s warlords and instead bide its time until the US-led UN combat force could be
withdrawn with minimal global media attention. Later, the counterinsurgency wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq proved enormously costly, in every sense of the word, to the intervening
powers. Moreover, such efforts dramatically illustrated that under currently prevailing political
and technological conditions, even the most puissant of democratic countries has enormous
difficulty dealing effectively with warlords, insurgents, and crime bosses who are indifferent to,
if not bluntly contemptuous of, the laws of war. The connection between the aforementioned
fiascos and the issues explored in Antonio Guiustozzi’s The Art of Coercion: The Primitive
Accumulation and Management of Coercive Power is not an obvious one, but it is intimate.
Dr. Giustozzi, a visiting professor of war studies at King’s College London, has written
extensively on Afghanistan’s ongoing civil war and the continuing development of Afghan
politics. It is unsurprising, given this background, that he should take an interest in the “primitive
accumulation” of coercive power. Primitive accumulation is a phrase generally associated with
economics, particularly Marxist analysis, of the very early stage in the development of a
capitalist economy, as, in Marx’s vision, formerly unowned or collectively owned resources such
as land are converted to private ownership. The author’s borrowing is a clever one, and his book
addresses an issue that has been greatly understudied by political scientists: the mechanics of
how coercion is used in the formation of governments and creation of states.
The notion that violent coercion is a key, even the key, component in the creation of
states itself certainly is not unique—indeed, it plays a key role in the standard narrative of how
the modern state came into existence. The history of how European monarchs, and the kings of
England and France in particular, slowly bled away the power and independence of the feudal
nobility and crafted recognizably modern states is generally treated as a sort of basic template for
what the modern state is and how it arises in the first place. This, in turn, is blended with the
emergence of the legal concept of sovereignty and its role in the crafting of the 1648 Peace of
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Westphalia, creating a cocktail that most political scientists find satisfactory: the old aristocrats
are humbled by monarchs empowered by increasingly sophisticated central governments, while
the trans-national Catholic Church either loses influence completely (in Protestant states) or finds
its power progressively diminished over the centuries as Catholic sovereigns ever-more jealously
guard their prerogatives. This is a tidy narrative; indeed, it is so neat because it glosses over
innumerable historical cross-currents and complications. Two oversimplifications stand out as
particularly critical. First, the enormous variation in state-building experiences is ignored; for
instance, the Anglo-French experience of state-building is distinct in a variety of important ways
from that of, say, Italy, which did not unify until the nineteenth century (and with the pope
continuing to wield temporal authority in the Papal States until unification, no less). The
“standard state-building story” is, arguably, even less applicable to modern states such as Persia
and Siam. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the distinction between supposedly
modern states and those governments which were allegedly “pre-modern” often becomes less,
rather than more, stark as one digs into the relevant history. Augustus Caesar administered
justice, organized public welfare programs, built infrastructure, and waged wars in a matter that
was not appreciably different in most respects from the manner in which Henry VIII performed
these functions. Indeed, Confucius was philosophizing about the duties and character of a
complex administrative state at a time when Rome was still so minor a power that if it had been
snuffed out entirely, that event would have been little-noticed even in most of the Italian
Peninsula.
Giustozzi clearly appreciates the complexity of historical formation, collapse, and
reformation of polities—and that this progression is not inevitably a “one-way” street. Thus, he
digs deeply into the historical record to understand how coercive power is accumulated,
translated into power over a geographical area, and progressively expanded outward. He
advances a number of interlinking hypotheses regarding how this occurs. First, he asserts “that
institution-building is a key aspect of any process of taming violence” (p. 7). Second, he claims
that “pre-empting hostile collective action through co-option, alliances, manipulation and
intimidation is as important as the mere accumulation of means of coercion, and entire agencies
of the state have been developed historically to implement this task” (p. 9). Third, Giustozzi
believes that the primitive accumulation of power generally is a ruthlessly violent process, with
civil conflict continuing until one faction can establish a monopoly on violence—but, notably,
even that monopoly may be broken, causing the process to begin again. Fourth, he says, “Often
in civil conflicts, violence is employed according to a logic and is therefore only seemingly
indiscriminate. But sophisticated military political actors clearly understand what kind of
violence is counter-productive,” with sophistication meaning at least some actors in a conflict
comprehend this reality, even if that is not the case with all of them (p. 12). Fifth, says Giustozzi,
“Policing is a specific strategy of consolidating the monopoly of violence” (p. 14). Sixth, he
asserts that “the renegotiation of the terms of the political settlement, which may include changes
in the command and control structure within the coercive apparatus, may weaken the ability of
the ruling elite to operate in a coordinated fashion and endanger the monopoly of violence” (p.
16-17). His final, and no doubt most controversial, hypothesis “is that external intervention, even
in its milder form of advice and support, is most likely to be counter-productive in achieving and
maintaining the monopoly of violence” (p. 18).
Given the general thrust of his hypotheses, it is unsurprising that Giustozzi has a rather
grim view of the process of state-building; he straightforwardly challenges some of the core
assumptions undergirding liberal interventionism, and his critique reflects the views of a writer
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who has an insightful and nuanced understanding of the issues at hand. It is striking that even
most of the supposed successes of liberal interventionism are at best decidedly incomplete,
according to Giustozzi. The intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, is often
spoken of as a great triumph, but that “country” has developed into a protectorate of the
European Union and remains hopelessly ethnically divided and guided by an EU-appointed High
Representative; in a more honest era, the latter’s title would have been that of “governorgeneral.” If establishing feeble quasi-colonial dependencies represents success, and mighty
NATO can pour hundreds of billions of dollars into Afghanistan for a dozen years and fail even
to hurtle over this risibly low bar, the liberal interventionist project needs a comprehensive
reconsideration. The Art of Coercion is an excellent starting point for that discussion, and this
thoughtful book should be read with interest not just by scholars but, even more importantly, by
soldiers and statesmen.
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